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Among all of the countries that border Ukraine, the Russian Fe-
deration is its most important partner. UkraineÕs relations with
Moscow are the key issue of its foreign policy to such an extent
that each option of the Ukrainian foreign policy is first and fore-
most a choice as to the shape of its relations with Russia. This is
mainly a consequence of UkraineÕs geographic and geopolitical
situation, the legacy of many centuries of political, economic and
cultural bonds between these two countries, as well as Rus-
siaÕs inevitably dominant position in their mutual relations. 
Furthermore, this is a consequence of the fact that the European
UnionÕs most important partner in the East of Europe is Russia,
while Ukraine is viewed (and will continue to be) by the EU ma-
inly in the context of its relations with Russia: the better these re-
lations, the better Ukraine will be perceived by Berlin, Brussels
and especially Paris. In the case of the United States the situation
is a little different, since the US is interested in the independen-
ce of UkraineÕs security policy from that of Russia, nevertheless
the Americans also see Ukraine mainly in the context of their re-
lations with Russia. On the other hand, after ten years of Ukra-
ineÕsexistence as an independent state there is no doubt that this
country has no chance of joining NATO or the European Union in
the foreseeable future (if ever). This makes the relations betwe-
en Moscow and Kyiv even more important. 
Theses 
1. Because of the diverse ties existing between Russia and Ukra-
ine, it was extremely difficult for these two countries to establish
normal interstate relations. Russia finally recognised Ukra-
ineÕs independence and borders (i.e. signed the treaty on mutual
relations) only in 1997, and only under pressure from the inter-
national community.
2. The disintegration of the USSRÕs single economic system re-
sulted in many difficulties, both for Russia and for Ukraine. Ukra-
ine, however, had to face more severe problems, because it was
more heavily dependent on its partner. Still, in spite of the Rus-
sian sideÕs attempts at exerting pressure, Ukraine has defended
its economic independence with great determination, while its
political classes have been aware that, in order to derive gains
from the economic co-operation with Russia, Ukraine has to pre-
serve its independence. 
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3. The year 2000 saw a breakthrough in Ukrainian Ð Russian re-
lations: their economic growth, which was achieved mainly due to
the good economic situation in Russia, made the Ukrainians awa-
re that there is no alternative to close co-operation with the Ru s-
sian Federation (even at the price of certain concessions). Mo-
s c o w, on the other hand, realised that it will be easier to pursue its
political goals in Ukraine if the Ukrainians are treated as partners.
4. It is in UkraineÕs primary interest to develop apartnership with
Russia, even if this partnership has to be unequal. It will enable
Ukraine to sustain its independence while closely co-operating in
economic and political terms. Still, Kyiv seeks a counterbalance
for its relations with Russia from the strategic partnership with
the USA. For Russia, on the other hand, it is in its best interest to
prevent NATOÕs presence on the northern coast of the Black Sea
and a too close alliance between Ukraine and the USA. These in-
terests are contradictory, but they may be reconciled so that they
do not lead to controversies and conflicts. 
5. RussiaÕs key economic goals in Ukraine are largely consistent
with the interests of Ukraine: Russian transit through the territo-
ry of Ukraine is a huge source of revenue for Kyiv, while the
growth of mutual business exchange is something which both co-
untries can benefit from. however their respective interests in the
energy sector are definitely contradictory. Russia wants to retain
the monopoly of natural gas supplies for Ukraine (supplying its
own gas or Turkmen gas transited through Russian territory) and
to limit its dependence on the transit of gas through Ukraine, whi-
le the interests of Kyiv are exactly the opposite. The Ukrainian si-
de, though, isnÕt really determined to pursue these interests. 
6. Like UkraineÕs political classes, its society is largely pro-inde-
pendence, but opposes the idea of loosening the relationship with
Russia. Therefore, the policy of Òasymmetric partnershipÓ and
Ukrainian Ð Russian rapprochement ÒsafeguardedÓ by Ukra-
ineÕs close co-operation with the USA, which was articulated in
the new foreign policy doctrine formulated in early 2001, may
meet with wide-spread support. 
7. It seems that this direction in the mutual policies will prove
permanent, both for Russia and for Ukraine. It will lead to the ti-
ghtening of the two countriesÕ mutual bonds, however the degree
of asymmetry of the partnership that is being formed remains
open to debate. however, it appears unlikely that Russia should
be able (or even willing) to ÒabsorbÓ Ukraine in the foreseeable
future, or that in Ukraine there would emerge major political gro-
ups ready to support this kind of political project. 
8. As yet, it is difficult to determine how the impending war aga-
inst terrorism will affect Ukraine and Ru s s i aÕ s mutual relations.
H o w e v e r, the expected Russian Ð American rapprochement is cer-
tainly in agreement with Ky i vÕ s disposition to develop closer rela-
tions both with the Russian Federation and with the United States.
I. Outline of the development 
of Ukrainian Ð Russian relations
from 1991 to 1999 
The Beginnings 
During the final period of USSRÕs existence the authorities of
Ukraine and Russia co-operated in their efforts against the
union-oriented Centre. However, the day after the signature of the
Commonwealth of Independent States formation treaty on De-
cember 8, 1991 conflicts of interests emerged and co-operation
gave way to rivalry. One of the basic causes of controversy was
the fact that the two countries had different ideas of the Com-
monwealth. For Ukraine, it was to be akind of Commission for the
Liquidation of the USSR, while Russia saw it as an instrument to
preserve the maximum possible degree of post-Soviet countriesÕ
integration and to carry out their future reintegration. 
A major factor that affected the development of independent
Ukraine and its relations with Russia is often overlooked. This is
the fact that UkraineÕs independence was a product the Soviet
political classesÕ division into republican "formations". It was
UkraineÕs Soviet ruling class that decided to form a state of its
own, and therefore this state has been a continuation of the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, both in terms of the interna-
tional law and in terms of its political system, economy and cul-
ture. Manifold bonds existed between the emerging Ukrainian po-
litical classes (with the exception of the very limited dissident
circles) and the Russian political classes. From the very begin-
ning this has been a major factor which made it extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for Kyiv to adopt a policy of definite sepa-
ration from Moscow, as independence-oriented right wing Ukra-
inian groups wanted. Thus, in the first years of UkraineÕs inde-
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pendence it was mainly the Russian FederationÕs confrontational
policy that pushed Ukraine towards the West. 
The beginnings of Russian Ð Ukrainian relations were very diffi-
cult. Ukraine was experiencing an independence induced eupho-
ria which bred excessive expectations regarding the West. At the
same time the Russian Federation was in a state of shock cau-
sed by the loss of lands that were considered to be historically
part of Russia and were largely inhabited by Russians. For some
time Moscow continued to articulate threats of border revision
and to promote the idea of UkraineÕsinevitable division into awe-
stern and an eastern part (this kind of suggestions continue to
appear in the Russian press even today). On the other hand, the
attitude adopted by Kyiv towards Russia in the first years of inde-
pendence was strict and in many respects unrealistic. Moscow
welcomed this attitude, as it slowed down the process of recogni-
sing Ukraine as a responsible member of the international com-
munity entitled to full rights. 
For the Russian Federation it was significant that along with its
territory, Ukraine took almost all of the Black Sea Fleet bases, as
well as the groups of strategic bombers and rockets armed with
over 1700 nuclear warheads. Also taken were two stations of the
nuclear attack early warning system, these being the most impor-
tant for Russia, as without them its anti-rocket defence system
lost sight of the south-west. Nevertheless, the two countries so-
on reached an agreement on this: Ukraine leased both these fa-
cilities to the Russian Federation and their operation continued
uninterrupted1. Similarly, Ukraine never questioned the presence
of Russian armed forces in Sevastopol. 
Ukraine did not accede to the CIS Collective Security Treaty (the
Tashkent Treaty), nor did it join the treaty on collective defence of
borders and many other CIS agreements, which Ukraine conside-
red disadvantageous. Also, Kyiv consistently and effectively op-
posed the transformation of the CIS into a superstate structure,
and from 1994 Ukraine developed a tendency to sabotage forms
of multilateral co-operation and to prefer bilateral co-operation
(including with the Russian Federation). This policy, supported by
some of the other CIS countries, ultimately led to the failure of
MoscowÕspolicies and to the decline of the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States. 
The policy of UkraineÕs first president Leonid Kravchuk was fair-
ly impressive and rather ineffectual. It was basically a policy of
gestures, both in relation to the West and to Russia. It led to the
recognition of Ukraine as an equal member of the community of
nations, but failed to solve any of the countryÕs major problems.
Especially in the relations with Russia Leonid Kravchuk proved to
be unable to develop workable compromises. However Russian
expectations were also exaggerated. In 1992Ð1994 the main po-
ints of debate could have been resolved in a manner that would
be much more favourable for Russia than the compromise re-
ached ultimately in 1997.
The attitude of UkraineÕs second president Leonid Kuchma was
radically different. Elected promising closer relations with Russia,
he pursued adefinitely patriotic yet simultaneously pragmatic po-
licy towards it from the start. This policy proved quite effective. In
February 1995 the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty of Friendship, Co-
operation and Partnership was signed. It did not include the pro-
visions on dual citizenship and the Black Sea Fleet that Russia
had proposed (both these issues were excluded to be settled in
a separate agreement), and its provisions on the recognition of
borders were absolutely univocal. Nevertheless, MoscowÕs agre-
ement to sign the Treaty depended on the signature of the accords
on the final division of the Black Sea Fleet and the terms and con-
ditions of Russian navyÕs stationing in Crimea. The absence of
any progress on this matter resulted in repeated cancellations of
the Russian president Boris YeltsinÕs visits to Kyiv. It was, howe-
ver, a success on the part of UkraineÕsdiplomacy to convince in-
ternational opinion that Moscow was responsible for the impas-
se in the negotiations and that the conditions it wanted to impo-
se would call into question UkraineÕs sovereign rule over a por-
tion of Crimea. 
The Ukrainian constitution passed in June 1996 ruled out the ful-
filment of one of RussiaÕs demands, namely the introduction of
dual citizenship (and of equal status of Russian as an official lan-
guage, which has been persistently, if unofficially, urged by the
Russian and some groups within the Ukrainian political classes).
The constitution did, however, allow the existence of a Russian
military base in Ukraine2. This opened the way to the final reso-
lution of the Sevastopol issue. 
Disintegration of the common 
economic system 
As aconsequence of the sudden introduction of state borders that
divided an area which used to be highly integrated in social and
economic terms, both parties encountered numerous new diffi-
culties. Ukraine became the owner of huge arms and chemical in-
dustries, of which it needed only a small fraction. Following the
Soviet military policyÕs breakdown, Russia didnÕt need much of
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these industries either. The fast disintegration of the command
economy, which was not accompanied by the introduction of
market economy mechanisms, caused anarchy in economic rela-
tions and the spontaneous formation of pseudo-market mechani-
sms that remain unclear even today. This affected international
economic relations as well. The crises of the post-Soviet econo-
mies (especially the dramatic decline in military contracts), com-
bined with excessive expectations regarding economic co-opera-
tion with the West, resulted in the mass-scale breaking of co-
operative ties between Ukrainian and Russian (as well as other
p o s t -Soviet) businesses. As a consequence, the years
1992Ð1993 saw a very serious decline in economic exchange
among the post-Soviet countries. 
Ukraine made intensive efforts to build its ãstructure of indepen-
denceÓ, introducing its own economic legislation and other me-
asures. However they failed to take into consideration the inevita-
ble consequences of such changes for the still existing common
monetary and customs systems. The other post-Soviet countries
did the same. The common legal system therefore disintegrated at
a very fast rate, which entailed disintegration of the other sys-
tems. The creation of a merely formal border (unguarded at the
beginning and not demarcated until today) afforded an excellent
source of revenue, especially for the large commercial companies
that speculated in different prices and exchange rates and took
advantage of the differences in legal situations (especially tax
laws). This new class of business people, which began to form
even before the break-up of the USSR, quickly transformed into an
influential group (or, more specifically, influential groups) whose
pressures have repeatedly influenced decisions at state level. 
In November 1992 Ukraine ceased to belong to the Ôrouble zoneÕ,
and the Russian ruble became foreign currency in Ukraine after
nearly a year of Òco-existenceÓ with the Ukrainian karbovanets
(coupon). It was Russia who inspired this move when growing in-
flation in Ukraine began to adversely affect the Russian economy
and to pose a threat to the reform program launched in Russia,
as the existence of the ruble zone had been an important factor
that stimulated the emergence and strengthening of the Ònew
UkrainiansÓ and Ònew RussiansÓ groups mentioned above. 
Almost immediately afterwards a significant asymmetry in eco-
nomic relations became apparent. It manifested itself in Ukra-
ineÕs heavy dependence on strategic supplies from Russia and in
RussiaÕs much slighter dependence on supplies from Ukraine.
Ukraine was mainly dependent on the supplies of raw materials
Ð it had to import huge quantities of natural gas (over 80% of its
supplies), oil (approx. 90%), as well as timber and cellulose (ap-
prox. 60% and 80%, respectively), and all of its nuclear fuel from
Russia. Diversification of supplies proved impracticable, even
though as a result of the oil products market demonopolisation
UkraineÕs dependence on supplies from Russia ceased to be ma-
jor threat. 
For Russia, on the other hand, supplies from Ukraine were not
strategically important (except for foods and some metallurgic
products), although the existence of many major Russian busi-
nesses was contingent upon some of them. Wealthier (because of
its easily marketable raw material resources) Russia was able
find replacement sources of supplies, either within its own eco-
nomy, or from the international market. While it was important for
Russia to sustain the co-operation with certain Ukrainian busi-
nesses from the arms sector, this was mainly due to the fact that
starting to produce the missing elements on its own (and establi-
shing design offices) would be too costly for Russia. For the Ukra-
inian arms industry, on the other hand, co-operation with Russian
partners was a matter of survival. 
Already around 1994 it became clear that Ukraine had little skill
in taking advantage of those few areas in which Russia was de-
pendent on it (these being mainly natural gas and oil transit, and
transit to and from the port of Odesa). Meanwhile, Russia would
use the supplies of natural gas as an instrument of political pres-
sure. This instrument, however, turned out to be barely effective.
Firstly, because in response to supply limitations Ukrainian busi-
nesses started consuming gas intended for Western customers
taken from the transit pipelines, and secondly, because Gazprom
pursued its own policy towards Kyiv, which was not always con-
sistent with the policy of the Russian Federation. 
As political controversies gradually lost importance, the focus of
Ukrainian-Russian relations shifted to economic issues. Here,
Ukraine had much less room for manoeuvre because, unlike po-
litical relations, it could not expect support from the West. What
is worse, slow structural reforms in Russia and the absence of
any such reforms in Ukraine created a distance that put Ukraine
in a much weaker position in any economic negotiations. Never-
theless, while there is simply no alternative to economic co -ope-
ration with Russia for Ukraine, the necessity of close economic
relations, and even of major concessions to the partner, does not
have to pose a threat to UkraineÕs independence. 
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Signature of the Ukrainian Ð Russian
treaty... 
Towards the end of 1996, when it became clear that the expansion
of NATO was inevitable, Ukraine started diplomatic action aimed
at ensuring that the AllianceÕs expansion does not adversely affect
its geo-strategic situation. This action brought the expected re-
sults, not only in the form of the NATO-Ukraine Charter: under evi-
dent pressure from the West, Moscow agreed to sign the treaty
with Ukraine along with the three agreements negotiated imme-
diately before, which governed the final division of the former
U S S RÕ s Black Sea Fleet and set out the terms and conditions on
which the Russian navy base in Sevastopol was to operate. It is
quite likely that these agreements were negotiated with confiden-
tial mediation of the NATO member states. On May 30, 1997, du-
ring president Ye l t s i nÕ s official visit to Kyiv the Ukrainian-Ru s s i a n
treaty and the Sevastopol agreements were finally signed3.
The Sevastopol agreements confirmed UkraineÕs unconditional
sovereign rule over the city and the naval port, but they guaran-
teed Russia the right to keep a navy base there for at least twen-
ty years. It was a compromise based on realistic analysis of ga-
ins and losses for both sides. It did not satisfy either party but it
was acceptable to both. Signature of the treaty closed the forma-
tion phase of the basic structures in Ukrainian Ð Russian inter-
state relations4. Russia ultimately gave up the idea of separating
Crimea or Sevastopol from Ukraine (if it had ever considered se-
riously this). In return it gained what it really wanted and secured
its significant interest, i.e. retained the military base in Crimea.
At the same time it prevented UkraineÕs potential accession to
NATO, and consequently, avoided the AllianceÕs presence on the
northern coast of the Black Sea. 
...and the framework economic 
agreement 
Following the signature of the treaty on friendship and co-opera-
tion, negotiations were undertaken with a view to conclude the
long-term economic agreement which was finally signed by pre-
sidents Leonid Kuchma and Boris Yeltsin on February 27, 1998
during the Ukrainian presidentÕs first official visit to Moscow. The
agreement on economic co-operation from 1998 to 2007 is a fa-
irly enigmatic document. Its key provision, Article 2, states that
the high parties signing the agreement, who recognise the ne-
cessity to gradually shape and develop a joint economic space,
shall create favourable conditions for the harmonisation of ba-
sic directions of social and economic change; structural recon-
struction; alignment of the normative and legislative founda-
tions of economic co-operation with abroad, customs tariff po-
licy, tax policy and antimonopoly legislation; the development of
separate projects and programs; promotion of co-operation; the
development of strong production structures; as well as for mu-
tual participation in privatisation and investment projects, in
compliance with national legislation 5.
The agreement also contains provisions on the necessity to align
the basic directions of market reforms in both countries and to
create the foundations for further development of integration
processes in the economy 6 (this is pure new-speak: in fact, in
1998 the disintegration processes were still going on). The media
on both sides have attached huge importance to this document,
but in fact it is little more than a letter of intentions that must be
followed by long and difficult inter-government negotiations and
real decisions, including the passing of numerous legislative acts.
What is also necessary is good will on both sides, i.e. the will to
achieve more than just conclusion of an agreement, a success
that is easy to turn to propaganda profit (especially in the cam-
paign running up to the Ukrainian parliamentary elections). One
more thing that significant about this agreement is its distinctly
bilateral nature: the Commonwealth of Independent States appe-
ars only as a decoration of no real consequence.
The agreement, however, is merely a preamble to the appendix
that details the scope of future arrangements. This appendix, en-
titled The Program of Economic Co-operation between Ukraine
and the Russian Federation for 1998Ð2007 (unpublished), com-
prises 130 paragraphs, of which 16 are devoted to co-operation
in the area of the armaments industry, and it makes a provision
for future negotiations aimed at liberalisation of the free trade
regime (in fact, adjustment of the terms of this trade to world
standards), uniformisation of the terms of imposing indirect ta-
xes, alignment (but not uniformisation) of customs tariffs and
procedures, establishing co-operation between the two countriesÕ
border and customs services (the more detailed propositions in
this respect could be summed up as calling for the introduction
of elementary legal and organisational order on the Russian Ð
Ukrainian border), and so on. The Program, nevertheless, rema-
ined dead, and real improvement in economic relations between
Russia and Ukraine did not take place until 20007.
Following a period of relatively good economic situation, the
Ukrainian Ð Russian economic co-operation wavered under the
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impact of the Russian crisis in 1998. Ukraine did not experience
a financial crash like the one in Russia, but the ties existing be-
tween the financial markets of both countries led to aserious we-
akening (not a breakdown, though) of the hryvnia in autumn that
year. This, in turn, adversely affected the economic exchange be-
tween Russia and Ukraine. In 1999 UkraineÕscommodity exports
to Russia had decreased 50 percent compared to 1995 and 22
per cent compared to 1997, while imports from Russia had de-
creased 1/3 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively 8. Exports of
services increased 40 per cent in 1997Ð1998, but in 1998 drop-
ped 30 per cent, while imports decreased 15 per cent and 10 per
cent, respectively . An important long term consequence of the
crisis was the reduced profitability of imports in both countries,
which stimulated domestic production. This, in turn, contributed
to the 2000 boom in Ukraine. 
Import of natural gas 
The supply and transit of natural gas is the key element in Ukra-
inian Ð Russian economic relations. Ukraine cannot survive wi-
thout the supplies of natural gas from Russia (or from other so-
urces through the territory of Russia)9, while for the Russian Fe-
deration the proceeds from natural gas exports are of crucial im-
portance for the stability of its public finances. Russia exports its
natural gas almost exclusively through the territory of Ukraine,
and the launch of the first branch of the Yamal pipeline has chan-
ged this situation by only a small extent 10. Ukraine is also one of
the major consumers of Russian gas, a consumer that Gazprom
could not do without in the early years (this changed around 1999
when Gazprom decided to maximise its exports outside the CIS).
In the early 90s, the import of natural gas was probably the most
criminally-affected sector of UkraineÕseconomy: all (or nearly all)
of Ukrainian oligarchical fortunes (and some of those in Russia)
were built on corrupt practices in the gas sector. These practices
caused losses for Gazprom, too, but in spite of the Ukrainian
partnersÕ growing debt, its supplies of gas to Ukraine must have
remained profitable, either for the concern or for its management,
whose private interests were often in conflict with the interests of
the company.
Following the break-up of the USSR, Ukraine assumed control
over the system of transit pipelines running across its territory. At
that time the management of Gazprom disregarded this fact, pro-
bably because it did not take the ultimate break-up of the com-
mon state seriously. This is why they later attempted to reclaim
this infrastructure (without success yet, even though it has ma-
de several such attempts). 
In the early 90s, UkraineÕs consumption of natural gas reached
115 billion cubic metres per year, dropping gradually over subse-
quent years and reaching 68.6 billion cubic metres in 200011. At
the same time, UkraineÕs domestic production decreased from
28.1 billion cubic metres in 1990 to 18.0 billion cubic metres in
2000 12. Nevertheless, the proportion of domestic production in
the energy balance increased. 
From the start (probably even before 1991), a portion of the gas
supplied to Ukraine originated from Turkmenistan. In 1996 this
country provided 18.3 billion cubic metres of gas, while Russia
provided 52.9 billion cubic metres (in 1997, 11.9 and 49.3 billion
cubic metres, respectively) 13. However, in 1997 Turkmenistan di-
scontinued its supplies because the Ukrainians failed to meet
their obligations. Unlike Russia, Turkmenistan was not dependent
on Ukraine for transit of gas exports and so could afford to cut off
supplies. The management of Gazprom took advantage of this si-
tuation and increased supplies to Ukraine so as to make up for
the shortage caused by the discontinuance of Turkmen imports.
At the same time Gazprom attempted to force the transformation
of the Ukrainian gas importersÕ debt into Ukrainian state debt14.
Given all this, the 1998 agreement on the supplies of natural gas
to Ukraine seriously worsened the Ukrainian sideÕs situation. The
arrangements that accompanied it secured aquasi-monopoly po-
sition in UkraineÕs internal market15 for ITERA-Ukraina16 (who al-
so acts as the provider of Turkmen gas). The debt relating to cur-
rent supplies ceased to accrue and the old debts were restructu-
red, but there was the growing problem of gas theft from transit
pipelines. Moscow would use this as an argument in bilateral ne-
gotiations and on the international scene to discredit Ukraine,
while the management of Gazprom did nothing to stop the theft.
It seems that the main reason for this was the fact that theft of
gas and its subsequent resale to the West was a source of profit
not only for the top management of UkraineÕsUkrhazprom, but al-
so for the top managers of Gazprom. 
In February 1998 Ukraine and Turkmenistan signed a long-term
agreement for the supply of natural gas, but the supplies under
this agreement were also soon discontinued. In 1998 Ukraine re-
ceived no Turkmen gas, while in 1999 the volume of supplies re-
ached approx. 8 billion cubic metres 17. Thus, Russia continued to
supply a major portion of the natural gas consumed by Ukraine.
Gazprom went on to take advantage of this situation, attempting
to assume control over Ukrainian transit gas pipelines (unsuc-
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cessfully) and over UkraineÕs metallurgic and chemical enterpri-
ses that were of interest to it (quite successfully)18.
II. Year 2000. Re - v a l u a t i o n .
Kyiv: its economic growth and 
disappointment for the West
The election of Leonid Kuchma for asecond term of office and the
appointment of Victor Yuschenko as Prime Minister increases ho-
pes for the beginning of radical reforms in Ukraine, which would
bring the country closer to West-European standards of economy
and social life. These hopes were only partially fulfilled. The eco-
nomic growth, achieved without any help from Western financial
institutions, turned out to be the main success of the Yuschenko
government. Nevertheless, the disappointment of the West with
Ukraine and vice versa was still growing even despite the govern-
mentÕs successes over the year 2000. On top of that, an under-
standing that there is no alternative to close co-operation with
Russia matured in Ukraine. 
The program executed by YuschenkoÕs government was aimed at
bringing order to the mechanisms of Ukrainian economic life, but
not at their radical change. Over the year 2000 Ukraine was ra-
ther reducing the distance from Russian Federation than beco-
ming closer to the Western standards. It is striking that the fun-
damental mechanisms of Ukrainian political life (especially the
struggle between the oligarchic and bureaucratic groups for influ-
ence over the president) and their changes reflect similar mecha-
nisms and processes in the Russian Federation19. For example,
the oligarchÕsattacks first on the Vice-Prime Minister Julia Tymo-
shenko and then on the Prime Minister Yuschenko were preceded
by similar attacks from their Russian counterparts on the Prime
Minister Sergei Kiriyenko in the summer of 1998. However, the
changes which the Russian political mechanisms have been un-
dergoing since 2000 still have not been seen in Ukraine. 
Ukraine experienced in 2000, for the first time since gaining in-
dependence, asubstantial economic growth (Gross National Pro-
duct rose by 6%, industrial production by 13%, agricultural by
7.5%) and an increase of budgetÕs income which improved the
social situation. The biggest increases were in food, steel and li-
ght industry. The increase was largely due to a growth in the pri-
ces of crude oil, which was unfavourable to Ukraine, but which
propelled RussiaÕs economic growth which in turn propelled the
demand for imports from Ukraine20. The second important factor
was the continuation of extensive privatization, as a result of
which numerous plants of heavy and chemical industry have be-
come the property of Russian capital and were able to increase or
even start production again. The Ukrainian economic and politi-
cal circles must have understood then that their country could
manage without the Western help, but not without close co-ope-
ration with Russia. 
On the other hand, the IMF did not resume loans to Ukraine in
2000 21 and the Western media would occasionally renew their
campaigns discrediting the country, Prime Minister Yuschenko
especially Ð the most pro-Western politician of UkraineÕsleaders,
seen there as the one Òappointed by the USAÓ. At the same time
an almost year-long discussion of the Russian project (which
mainly took place in Poland not in Ukraine) for a new gas pipeli-
ne which would go around the territory of Ukraine combined with
BrusselsÕ attitude towards an increase of the import of Russian
gas have made the Ukrainian political class aware that EU sees
the Russian Federation as its main partner in Eastern Europe,
and from Kyiv it expects good relations based on partnership with
Moscow22.
Some time earlier, in 1999, another event happened which we-
akened the pro-Western affinities. This was the war in Kosovo
and NATOÕs attack on Yugoslavia. Although Kyiv, unlike Moscow,
did not openly protest against the PactÕs activities and later wil -
lingly took part in apeace operation, the Ukrainian politicians did
not hide that their sympathies lay on the side of Serbs, not with
the Albanians. The feelings of the Ukrainian society, to whom the
Serbs (Slavic and Orthodox) are closer than the Muslim Alba-
nians, were similar23.
In October 2000, out of 100 leading Ukrainian experts (civil se-
rvants, analysts from non-governmental organizations and media)
who were polled, 80 regarded UkraineÕs relations with Russia as
the priority of its foreign policy (66 with the USA, 62 with Germa-
n y, 52 with Poland, 25 with China, other countries scored under
20). Among the countries with which co-operation is crucial for
fulfilling the aims of Ukrainian foreign policy, Russia was indica-
ted by 89 (the USA by 90, Germany by 80, Poland by 58, China by
36, Great Britain by 34, France by 28), and to a question on mili-
tary help from which country Ukraine can count in case of aggres-
sion Russia was indicated by 48 (the USA by 54, Poland by 30,
Germany by 20)2 4. The poll gives an insight into the beliefs of the
Ukrainian political class which puts relations with the Russian Fe-
deration and the United States as the priorities for its policy.
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Moscow: New pragmatism 
The new president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, has
given up his predecessorÕs inconsistent policy towards Ukraine,
which was coloured with a certain post-soviet nostalgia and the
hopes of the still more and more mythical Òre-integration of the
CISÕ countriesÓ. Moscow has understood and accepted the fact
that UkraineÕs independence is irreversible and that it would be
in RussiaÕs interest to respect this, not only making its policy to-
wards Kyiv easier, but also improving the Russian Federa-
tionÕs image world-wide. The change contributed to improvement
of bilateral relations in the years 2000Ð2001. 
During the presidential campaign of 1999 in Ukraine, Russia 
remained restrained. Relatively late in the campaign it opted for
Leonid Kuchma as the least inconvenient of the important candi-
dates. His main rival, a communist Petro Symonenko, was dan-
gerous to Moscow as he is an ally of Gennady Zyuganov. Kuchma
however, was already known and was also liked and valued 
by Boris Yeltsin. If the change of leaders in the Kremlin had hap-
pened earlier, Russia might have decided to support Oleksandr
Moroz, the only candidate who in those elections constituted 
a real political alternative to Kuchma. 
Since 2000 RussiaÕs politics have become more pragmatic and
predictable, and Russia itself ruled much more consistently, and
therefore stronger. PutinÕs Russia has given up treating the CIS as
a tool in re-integration of the Òpost-USSR spaceÓ and with deter-
mination has backed bilateral relations with the member coun-
tries of the CIS. The Kremlin has decided that treating Ukraine as
a partner and an ally, and not as a Òtransient countryÓ, would
make it easier to achieve the important political aims connected
with this much weaker country. It has turned out to be agood de-
cision. The new political direction has removed the main psycho-
logical impediment in the way of tightening the Ukraine-Russia
relationships, enabling Kyiv to make some concessions to its nor-
thern neighbour.
As the chief of the Council for Foreign Affairs and Security of the
Russian Federation Sergei Karaganov said at the beginning of
2001: Russia is interested in a stable Ukraine (É) Russia ne-
eds a friendly Ukraine. (É) Russia cannot afford the luxury of
supporting Ukraine financially. Moreover, according to Ka r a g a n o v :
A downfall of UkraineÕs economy means a catastrophe for Rus-
sia25. Boris Tarasyuk, UkraineÕs previous minister of foreign affa-
irs, similarly assesses the situation: Since Vladimir PutinÕs vic-
tory in elections we have clearly experienced a new approach of
the Russian Federation. It is characterised by firmer relations
and I would even say, pressure on Ukraine. Nowadays, there is
less sentiment in the relationship of the leaders and more prag-
matism, which is positive in itself. But if you are the weaker par-
ty, such pragmatism turns into the partnerÕs pressure26. Never-
theless, contrary to TarasyukÕsbeliefs, it is difficult to see any in-
crease in RussiaÕs pressure on Ukraine. It was especially notice-
able during gas negotiations at the end of 2000, which gave Kyiv
some unexpected benefits 27. As a Russian political commentator
has accurately remarked, YuschenkoÕs pro-Western policy was
favourable to Russia as the new Ukrainian government honestly
addressed the issue of debts and gave Russian businessmen wi-
de access to legal privatization in Ukraine28. The dismissal of Ihor
Bakai, the director of Ukrhazprom, who was a patron of the ma-
fia-like relations of Russia and Ukraine (responsible for stealing
of Russian gas) was also convenient to Russia (as it weakened
Rem Vyakhiryev whom Putin wanted to remove29). A certain har-
dening of RussiaÕs standpoint in economic matters did not take
place until 2001. 
A new doctrine of UkraineÕs foreign 
policy
Re-orientation of UkraineÕs foreign policy resulted from the abo-
ve mentioned political re-valuation both in Kyiv and in Moscow.
The ÒZlenkoÕs doctrineÓ, formulated in the beginning of 2001, was
one of its results. It concentrates on co-operation with Russia
and the USA, although relations with the former should be based
on Òasymmetrical partnershipÓ which is often compared (a bit
prematurely) to the relations between Canada and the USA.
The first sign of that re-orientation was the dismissal of Boris Ta-
rasyuk (a pro-Western minister of Foreign Affairs) in September
2000, which resulted in immediate and clear warming of bilate-
ral relations. The new minister, Anatolii Zlenko, in his first public
statement said that relations with the Russian Federation are the
greatest priority of Ukrainian foreign policy. In January 2001 Zlen-
ko publicly expressed a new doctrine of UkraineÕs foreign policy
(although he did not call it a doctrine) stating that Ukraine has
only two strategic partners30: the Russian Federation and the
USA, which pushed the relations with EU to the background.
Let us quote the key fragment of ZlenkoÕs speech during a press
conference in Kyiv on 23rd Jan. 2001: Ensuring favourable exter-
nal conditions is crucial to be able to care calmly about the in-
ternal transformation and the execution of the European choice.
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Under present circumstances it basically means for Ukraine the
development of a strategic partnership with the Russian Fede-
ration and the United States. Ibelieve that friendly and pragma-
tic relations with these countries are crucial to our safety. (É)
It also envisages tightening the contacts with Berlin, London and
Paris based on partnership31.
If the development of strategic partnership with the USA is a m e-
ans of execution of the European choice and the European Union
(Brussels) as a political partner is not even mentioned, it must
mean that UkraineÕs European choice is nothing more but a Ò s m o-
ke s c r e e nÓ thrown to divert the attention of European capital cities
from the already crystallised ÒAmerican choiceÓ. Kyiv has drawn
conclusions from the fact that there is no alternative to close co-
operation with Russia in economic matters and that its attempt to
become closer to the European Union has failed. It is also aware
of the importance of Ukraine in global American politics. It there-
fore perceives good relations between Ukraine and America (espe-
cially in the area of security) as a counterbalance protecting Ukra-
ine from falling into political dependence on Ru s s i a .
In his speech in Heritage Foundation on 27th March 2001, mini-
ster Zlenko very strongly accentuated the importance of partner-
ship between Ukraine and America for strategic interests of both
countries. While talking about Ukrainian-American relations, he
said: As far as Russia is concerned, also here we have witnes-
sed a positive development or, to use a diplomatic clich,
a Òmovement in the right directionÓ. In my opinion one of the
main achievements in this path is the fact that a large part of
Russian political establishment has started to recognise the in-
dependence and the European choice of Ukraine as objective
reality and not personal offence. We do not intend to become
a part of any empire again. We do not intend to become a sphe-
re of influence of any country. We want to be areliable and equ-
al partner. And I believe that RussiaÕs current leaders respect
this course. (É) The atmosphere of mutual respect has been
strengthened in the relations between Kyiv and Moscow. It is ve-
ry rare nowadays to hear the official thesis about the, so called,
Òunion of Slavic countriesÓ. Moscow wishes to create the rela-
tions with us according to the ÒCanada-USAÓ model. Those who
have followed the development of Ukrainian-Russian relations
since 1991 will admit that it is a huge step forward32.
Bilateral relations and the political 
crisis in Ukraine
The political crisis which shook Ukraine in autumn 2000 and
spring 2001, and which contributed to the fall of the Prime Mini-
ster Victor Yuschenko did not affect the Ukraine-Russia relations
significantly. However, it seriously damaged UkraineÕs relation-
ship with the European Union. It is plausible to suspect that it will
be long-term damage (although in summer 2001 there was acer-
tain restoration of BrusselsÐKyiv relations). EU (with no serious
political and economic interests in Ukraine) will be willing to tre-
at the country mainly dependant on the freedom of the media, of
the citizens, etc. Ð i.e. factors which are less important for EU 
in the relationship with Russia. This, in turn, will strengthen an
anti-European attitude among the Ukrainian elite. 
Meanwhile, Russia remained restrained during the crisis. The
mild embarrassment of Russian politicians (about the scandal
casting ashadow of doubt over the president of Ukraine and abo-
ut the ensuing crisis undermining his position) was visible at that
time. However, the Russian media which promoted a thesis of an
ÒAmerican traceÓ tried to reinforce the dislike of the nation (its
own mainly, but also Ukrainian) for the USA. It is worth mentio-
ning that such a version of events (according to which the Ame-
rican secret service was behind the provocation with the alleged
recordings of the conversations of president Kuchma with the aim
of paving the way for Prime Minister Yuschenko to become presi-
dent) is very popular in Ukraine. At the same time hardly anyone
(apart from radical nationalists) believes the rival version bla-
ming the secret service of the Russian Federation for the provo-
cation.
That Russian embarrassment with the situation in Ukraine resul-
ted from the belief that astrong president of the Russian Federa-
tion needs astrong partner in Ukraine. The belief that it is in Rus-
siaÕs interests to weaken president KuchmaÕsposition is unfoun-
ded. It would be easier to persuade a strong and independent
Kuchma to make concessions than a weakened one and therefo-
re forced to take into account his opponents accusing him of
excessive submission to Russia, selling out national interests,
and even high treason. Only a strong president of Ukraine would
be able to propagate the convenient solution (for Russia) to 
the problem of the control over the Ukrainian system of transit pi-
pelines; probably the most important Òissue to be solvedÓ for
Russia in Ukraine. 
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The nomination of Anatolii Kinakh for Prime Minister (while pre-
serving almost the entire makeup of the government) did not re-
sult in a serious change in relations with Russia. The extremely
difficult economic negotiations (where Kyiv has not wanted to
concede) have lasted for a very long time now. And with the elec-
tion campaign starting soon, it would be unreasonable to expect
any decisive agreement on the most important issues. 
On 10th May 2001, Victor Chernomyrdin became the new ambas-
sador of the Russian Federation to Ukraine. This caused trium-
phal comments in Moscow and the alarming ones in Kyiv, all of
them mentioning Chernomyrdin as a ÒgovernorÓ, or even a Òvice-
presidentÓ of Ukraine. Even taking into account journalistic exag-
geration, the comments were strikingly unjustified. The nomina-
tion fits in with the logic of RussiaÕsnew approach towards Ukra-
ine; its strong pragmatism, but also a serious treatment of the
partner. It is another matter altogether that Chernomyrdin started
his mission in the worst possible way: publicly criticising and la-
ter boycotting the visit of Pope John Paul II to Ukraine. It is also
worth noting that soon after ChernomyrdinÕs appointment to Kyiv
speculation arose that Yevhen Marchuk (a former Prime Minister,
the current Secretary of the Council of National Security and 
Defence of Ukraine) Ð one of the leading politicians of Ukraine Ð
might become the new ambassador of Ukraine to Moscow.
Natural gas and the military-technical
co-operation
The agreements about delivery conditions and transit of natural
gas signed on 22nd December 2000 turned out to be surprisingly
favourable to Ukraine 33. The fact that Russia agreed to postpone
negotiations on admitting Gazprom to participate in the manage-
ment of the Ukrainian system of transit pipelines as well as on re-
structuring the Ògas debtsÓ34 was most important. The only cru-
cial concession made by Kyiv was to give up the export of its na-
tural gas 35. Russia also agreed to send Turkmen gas to Ukraine
and to the fact that Ukraine would not buy Russian gas in 2001
(apart from the amount received in lieu of transit fees)36. It is fa-
vourable to Gazprom which at the moment favours expansion to
European markets at the expense of the less profitable sale to the
CIS markets (including Russia). A basic agreement on restoring
co-operation in research and development as well as produc-
tion of arms industry was signed during the same meeting of the
presidents in St. Petersburg.
Next, on 12th Dec. 2001 in Dnipropetrovsk the presidents of Rus-
sia and Ukraine signed a package of agreements specifying the
St. Petersburg agreement. Most of these are just memorandums
which will serve as a basis for specific contracts. The scale of
Ukrainian concessions is much smaller than it seems from the
tone of both Russian and Ukrainian commentaries. The negotia-
tions on restoring unity of power systems in both countries (bro-
ken off in 1998 due to technical not political reasons) proved to
be very difficult. The agreement was not signed until August 2001
on conditions favourable to both parties and not only to Russia (or
rather to the Russian power industry monopolist, RAO JES Rossii). 
It should be noticed that parallel to the president PutinÕs visit in
Dnipropetrovsk, Jeffrey Starr (a representative of the minister of
National Defence of the USA) visited Kyiv. He met Marchuk
(a person co-ordinating the whole issue of national security on
behalf of the president) instead of the minister or vice-minister of
Defence. In this way Kyiv sent a very clear signal that the USA 
remains its strategic partner and that special partnership with
NATO Ð an important element of UkraineÕs national security. The
Americans, in turn, showed that tightening of Russian-Ukrainian
relationships does not stand in the way of a strategic partnership
between Kyiv and Washington. Both signals were directed to the
Russian Federation as well as to the European Union. 
In 2001 a certain breakthrough was achieved in regulating the
stationing of two navy fleets in a base in Sevastopol. The introduc-
tion of joint garrison patrols, traffic control of SevastopolÕs h a r b o-
ur (until then done by the Russians only), a decision about cre-
ating a mixed lifeboat service unit were agreed on among other
t h i n g s3 7. This way Kyiv strengthened its sovereignty in Sevastopol
without conceding in such matters as the control over introducing
new Russian weapons to Sevastopol and the right of inspection of
Russian arsenal3 8 (both these are important for Russia). It should
be noted however, that serious Russian concessions coincided
with Ukrainian declaration of reluctance towards the American ini-
tiative of the Òson of star warsÓ anti-rocket shield.
The Russian-Ukrainian border
The last serious problem in the political relations between Ukra-
ine and Russia has been the delimitation of the common border.
There has never been a border between Ukraine and Russia, just
a line separating the administrative units drawn arbitrarily on the
maps and approximately marked in terrain, devoid of any practi-
cal meaning. The border Òhas crossedÓ unified complexes of agri-
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cultural land or even towns39. Also the routes of railways, roads,
pipelines, etc. have not been consistent with the borders of the
republics (the main transport lines from Moscow to the Northern
Caucasus crossed Eastern Ukraine). It caused serious problems
during delimitation, as the principle of specifying and not chan-
ging borders has been unanimously agreed on. 
Since the dissolution of the USSR the Russian Federation has be-
lieved that the borders of the CIS countries are divided into the
ÒexternalÓ (of ex-USSR) and ÒinternalÓ (of ex-republics), therefore
opposing any regulation by law (including delimitation) of the latter.
Ukraine has been consequently rejecting such division and trying to
grant the same status to all its borders. For six years Moscow eva-
ded the start of delimitation work, until in February 1998 it agreed
to appoint an appropriate committee. However, even during the first
session (1s t April 1998) it turned out that the Russian party was on-
ly authorised to talk about the land border and not delimitation of
the waters of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait, while the sea bor-
der was the main problem here. Moscow believes that the above
mentioned reservoirs should be recognised as ÒcommonÓ and the
national border should not be marked out there. Ukraine, on the
other hand, believes that they should be divided.
Work on delimitation of the land border was completed to almost
100%40 in 2000. The lack of agreement on the sea border (there
has been no change in both countriesÕ standpoints, there has al-
so been no sign of willingness to compromise) however, makes
signing the delimitation contract and the start of demarcation
work impossible. It is to be expected that Russia will try to post-
pone demarcation and Kyiv will be less firm here than in the is-
sue of delimitation. Anatolii Zlenko, the minister of Foreign Affa-
irs in Ukraine, declared after his visit to Moscow in October 2000
that Ukraine and Russia would not introduce visa regime and de-
marcation of the border41. According to the available information
Zlenko later withdrew the second statement and said that demar-
cation would be carried out. Nevertheless, even if that was just
a gaffe, it was a meaningful one42. At the same time asolution of
the Azov Sea problem does not seem real without mediation from
the Western superpowers.
Language and culture
The heritage of a few centuries of the common cultural space of
the Russian Empire and later of USSR is a separate issue, which
has not been included in the narrowly understood Ukrainian and
Russian inter-state relationships, but which has had acertain in-
fluence on them. That heritage is in form of the millions of people
who live in Ukraine and every day use mainly or exclusively the
Russian language. Many Russian politicians believe all Russian-
speaking inhabitants of Ukraine (and other CIS countries) to be
ethnic Russians and a national minority, whom Russia ought to
provide not only with care but also protection from discrimination
and Ònationalistic tendenciesÓ of the authorities of the countries
they live in. 
According to the newest research, only 39.1% of the inhabitants
of Ukraine use exclusively Ukrainian on an every day basis, 36%
Ð only Russian, 24.8% Ð both languages depending on the cir-
cumstances. However in the group of people up to 22 years old
47.4% use only Russian 43. Assuming that use of both languages
Òdepending on the circumstancesÓ largely means restricting the
use of Ukrainian to home and/or school, the real scope of Russian
language use is much higher.
In 1991 49.3% of pupils and students of the Ukrainian primary
and secondary schools studied in Ukrainian44, however higher
education was almost completely in Russian. In the 90sthat per -
centage probably increased up to 75-85% (the appropriate data
has not been published) and many universities (humanistic at 
least) largely used Ukrainian45. The introduction of Ukrainian as
an official language of administrative and economic structures
was much more difficult. Very often only some official documents
(reports, etc.) are written in the official language but Russian re-
mains the real language of official duties. Only in the West of Ukra-
ine has the Ukrainian language achieved the status of the main
language of public life, but it is a region where there are almost no
Ru s s i a n -speaking Ukrainians and Russians are quite scarce. 
However, the bureaucratic Ukrainianisation was not accompanied
by a concern for Ukrainianisation of mass culture. For ten years
all popular literature, pop music, ÒyellowÓ and advice press, etc.
were written in Ukraine almost entirely in Russian46. Only elitist li-
terature and school handbooks were available in Ukrainian. What
was even worse, a harsh tax and customs legislation led to do-
mination of the Ukrainian book market by Russian publishers. As
a result, Russian has become extremely popular among a large
part of young people. They speak Russian (very often Ôbroken
RussianÕ) because it is a craze. On the other hand, Ukrainian
schools and Ukrainianisation of Òpublic spaceÓ (inscriptions, an-
nouncements of authorities, partly advertisements) and of elec-
tronic media has created bilinguality of a new type Ð more and
more inhabitants of Ukraine can use both languages more or less
fluently47.
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In the tenth year of an independent Ukraine the Ukrainian langu-
age can be heard more often than in 1991 in the streets of Kyiv
(although still not very often), whereas in the streets of Lviv, whe-
re Russian was hardly ever heard 10 years ago, it is now as com-
mon as Ukrainian in Kyiv. And following public discussions on the
status of the Ukrainian language in the country, reform of spel-
ling, etc., it would be difficult not to think that only few members
of the Ukrainian political elite understand the significance of the
problem and seriously consider finding its solution.
On 23rd Feb. 2000 Ukraine and Russia signed an inter-govern-
mental agreement of co-operation in the field of radio and televi-
sion. Among its provisions there is a clause where Ukraine agre-
es to broadcast Russian TV programmes without Ukrainian dub-
bing (never used in practice) and its handing over control over the
re-transmission contracts of these programmes by Ukrainian ca-
ble operators48. These are serious concessions limiting Ukra-
ineÕs sovereignty of information, as they will result in strengthe-
ning the domination of Russian information and political com-
mentary programmes on the Ukrainian airwaves. What is striking
is the fact that the agreement was signed by Ivan Drach, the cha-
irman of the National Committee for Politics of Information, who
in his public appearances has often attacked the excessive pre-
sence of Russian media in Ukraine. It confirms a belief that the
real politics of Ukraine is much more pro-Russian than its politi-
cal rhetoric.
The above situation is portrayed by the activists of the Russian
minority in Ukraine as discrimination against the ÒRussian-spe-
aking majority Ó49 and every attempt to increase presence of the
Ukrainian language in public life of Ukraine (in the media espe-
cially) triggers off their violent and hostile reaction repeated by
the Russian media. This, in turn, from time to time provokes
a sharp criticism of Kyiv by Russian politicians, most importantly
by MPs (e.g. a statement made by a vice-Prime Minister Victor
Khristenko during the Internet conference of 1st August 2001, who
demanded that the Russian language to be granted the status of
an official language). Such statements disrupt bilateral relations
every time they happen but only temporarily. As it seems, both si-
des understand these clashes are mere ritual.
III. Russia and Ukraine: 
contradiction and convergence
of interests
Ukraine and Russia are connected by basic strategic interests.
Some of them converge, which is conducive to bringing both co-
untries closer, other are contradictory, making it more difficult.
Many of these spheres of interests have already been mentioned.
However it seems useful to discuss them separately. The most
basic interest of Ukraine is to keep its independence and maxi-
mum possible autonomy from the Russian Federation, while 
RussiaÕs most basic aim is not to allow the politics of Kyiv to let
NATO Òsettle downÓ on the coast of the Black Sea. Since Moscow
gave up its attempts to reinstate control over Ukraine, these ba-
sic interests have stopped being contradictory and their harmo-
nisation has become possible.
Russia
It is in the key interest of Russia to stop Ukraine extending its cur-
rent co-operation with NATO beyond the limits of the present
ÒPartnership for PeaceÓ and to prevent the US from gaining more
political influence in Ukraine. Moscow perceives such influence
as a threat to its strategic position in the Black Sea Basin and to
its ability to influence the situation in the Balkans. It is in this
context that one should see RussiaÕs ambition to retain its base
in Sevastopol, a facility of key importance on the Black Sea. Mo-
scow sees the potential presence of NATO on the Black Sea nor-
thern coast as a threat to its security and does not want to sha-
re its political (especially military-political) influence in Ukraine
with the Western world. 
This geopolitical concern is related to the crucial importance of
UkraineÕs territory as a transit area for Russia. It is not only the
well known significance of gas and oil pipelines running across
Ukraine to the countries of Central and Western Europe. Equally
important is the availability of the oil pipelines and product pipe-
lines50 leading to the OdesaÐIlichivsk port complex, as well as
RussiaÕs ability to export electricity (which it has not regained
yet)51 and the stability of road and rail transit to and from these
ports and to and from the Ukrainian ports on the Danube. Access
to the countries of Eastern and, in particular, Southern Europe
and to Turkey through the territory of Ukraine is also of no small
significance for Russia. Today, the route across eastern Ukraine
remains the shortest and the most convenient way from central
C E S  s t u d i e s
Russia to Ro s t o v -on-Don, Novorossiysk (where the Black Sea Fle-
et infrastructure is being developed) and to the Northern Cauca-
sus, while the Kerch Strait continues to provide the way from the
Volga river basin, i.e. from central Russia, to the worldÕs o c e a n s5 2.
Russia also has other diverse economic interests in Ukraine,
which are not related to transit. Today, the most vital one seems
to be the import of Ukrainian foods (especially sugar, meat and
meat products, and spirits). The fact that Russia took temporary
measures to prevent the growth of Ukrainian exports of these go-
ods to its market, e.g. by introducing prohibitive tariffs or threate-
ning to initiate anti-dumping procedures, was aresult of the con-
flicts of interests among particular groups of Russian businesses.
At the same time it confirmed the competitive advantage of Ukra-
inian foods in the Russian market. Russia may buy these and
other commodities from other sources, but Ukraine offers them at
the lowest prices and within the shortest distance. 
The Russian economy (though not necessarily the Russian state)
also needs UkraineÕs metallurgic, petrochemical, chemical and
arms industries, some of which are even indispensable for it
(such as the Ukrainian rocket and spacecraft industry). In many
cases it is easier and cheaper to restore the co-operative ties
broken after 1991 than to start their own production of parts for-
merly manufactured in Ukraine or seek other sources of imports. 
Therefore, it is in the best interest of Russia (and large Russian
enterprises) to expand Russian businessesÕ presence in Ukraine
and to limit the presence of businesses from other countries the-
re (unless they make investments that are compatible with the
interests of Russia, such as the development of Ukraine foods in-
dustry, or carry out investments in co-operation with Russia). The
Russian Federation also needs Ukraine as a huge market for its
commodities, i.e. mainly natural gas, oil and oil products, but al-
so, to a growing extent, Russian manufactured products, which
lack competitive advantage in world markets. 
Finally, RussiaÕs interests in Ukraine include the so called Rus-
sian issue. RussiaÕsconcern for the situation of Russians in other
post-Soviet countries is about understandable national solidarity,
but it also has a measurable, even if secondary, economic
aspect: there still exists one unified or near-unified market of
Russian books, press and electronic media.
Ukraine
For Ukraine, it is in its basic interest to preserve independence
(still in peril, from KyivÕs subjective point of view) and to prevent
RussiaÕs inevitable political and economic dominance from ma-
king Ukraine politically dependent. On the one hand, this is abo-
ut modelling the relations with Russia as an Òasymmetric part-
nershipÓ and reinforcing UkraineÕs position as a self-determined
subject in international relations, and on the other, about mainta-
ining, or even increasing, the degree of separateness of Ukra-
ineÕslegal space. Not only because such separateness is a token
of sovereignty: differences in customs laws, tax laws, etc are
a huge source of revenue for UkraineÕs businesses (and for Rus-
sian businesses too). 
To achieve these goals Ukraine needs as close as possible a co-
operation with the US, especially in the area of security, and it ne-
eds to make sure that all Russian Ð American agreements take
into account its security interests. Relations with other European
countries are of lesser importance, because these countries are
unlikely to be willing to counterbalance Russian influence in Kyiv.
Nevertheless, Ukraine is not interested in substituting the United
StatesÕ military presence in its territory for RussiaÕs military pre-
sence (now limited to Sevastopol), and it seems highly unlikely
that it would start a considerably closer military co-operation
with the USA (i.e. go beyond the limits of the ÒPartnership for 
PeaceÓ in this respect). Kyiv is perfectly aware that it is vital for
Ukraine not to vex its relations with Russia, especially in the
sphere of security.
The second key interest of Ukraine is connected with its depen-
dence on energy supplies from Russia. The latter country provi-
des most of the oil and natural gas53 consumed by Ukraine and all
of UkraineÕs nuclear fuel, and in the past has often exploited
UkraineÕs dependence on these supplies for political purposes.
Ukraine should therefore seek diversification of energy supply 
sources (this does not include nuclear fuel, in the case of which
diversification is not possible). Unfortunately, Kyiv does not show
much political will or determination to carry out such aproject. No
doubt, one of the factors that stop its diversification efforts are
the activities of the agents of influence of Russia (or Russian
energy raw material exporters). Another important factor is the
profit that Ukraine derives from the transit of energy carriers: it is
crucial for the Ukrainian economy to retain these revenues. 
Ukraine is interested both in keeping up the Russian transits thro-
ugh its territory (as an important source of profit and a consequ-
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ential political factor) and in exporting to Russia any goods that
Russia may possibly be willing to buy. For many Ukrainian busi-
nesses co-operation with Russian partners is a matter of survi-
val, while these partners see this co-operation merely as benefi-
cial. Some Ukrainian analysts even believe that the Russian mar-
ket affords Ukraine the sole opportunity for economic growth, the
events of the last two years seem to substantiate this opinion. 
I V. To Europe together with
Ru s s i a ?
Most Ukrainians oppose aradical break with Russia. When asked
what relations between Ukraine and Russia should be like, 19%
in 1996 and only 9% in 2001 replied that these should be rela-
tions like those with any other state: with visas, custom duties,
closed borders, etc. On the other hand, the idea of a union be-
tween Ukraine and Russia was supported by 25% and 32% 
of respondents respectively. The most favoured option, however,
was the one of friendly relations between two independent states,
without visas or custom duties: it was supported by 55% and 
56%, respectively54.
When evaluating relations between Ukraine and Russia in 1997,
34% of respondents said they were normal, i.e. each side defen-
ded its interests, 30% believed that they were characterised by
a certain tension and a mutual lack of confidence, 13% described
them as a mutually profitable co-operation, and only 6 % said
these relations were overtly hostile55. Given the clear improve-
ment in bilateral relations that occurred in 2000, one can assu-
me that today fewer respondents would choose the second
option, while more would be for the first and the third one. These
polls (and many similar ones) confirm the opinion that the Ukra-
inian society does not want the distance between Ukraine and
Russia to broaden, and that a large portion of it would be willing
to accept a re-integration, even though at the same time this so-
ciety is now strongly attached (or rather accustomed) to having
a state of its own.
The majority of the Ukrainian political elite are convinced of the
necessity to co-operate closely with Russia and they generally re-
fer to such co-operation as Òstrategic partnershipÓ, regardless of
whether they are happy about this necessity or not. Only the right
wing nationalist or near-nationalist parties are strongly against
this co-operation. It is characteristic that only such nationalist or
near-nationalist groups and the ostensibly pro-Russian post-
communist parties distinctly state their opinions. The broadly un-
derstood centre avoids doing this, probably in order to conceal its
real viewpoint (much more pro-Russian than the patriotic electo-
rate supporting the parties of the centre might be able to accept). 
On April 17, 2001 an inter-faction group was formed in the Ver-
khovna Rada of Ukraine named ãTo Europe together with RussiaÓ,
which was joined by 32 deputies from the oligarchic factions. 
It was the first such clear manifestation of UkraineÕs Eurasian
program. This program could be summed up as follows: Ukraine
may integrate with the European structures only as much as the
Russian Federation will, and the European policies of both coun-
tries should be highly co-ordinated. 
The leader of this group, Dmytro Tabachnyk explains the objecti-
ves of its activities as the establishment of closer co-operation
between the parliaments of Ukraine and Russia, and harmonisa-
tion of the two countriesÕ economic legislation, and abolition of
quotas, customs charges and export restrictions, especially for
the machine-building industry. In his opinion, it should be the
strategic goal of Ukraine and Russia to co-ordinate the efforts of
their diplomacies aimed at more effective alignment with the
European structures, for geography, history, territorial borders
and, finally, fate itself have determined that Russia should be
a European state. This has been recognised by all European
structures: Russia is amember of the Council of Europe and the
OSCE, and it is integrating with other European organisations.
The most important objective of Ukraine and Russia is to join
the European Union56.
This couldnÕt be explained more clearly. TabachnykÕs words echo
a slightly earlier statement by minister Zlenko: Our choice is 
Europe, but one shouldnÕt think that we realise it in separation
from our neighbour Russia57.
V. Can this be done?
This political calculation seems reasonable. The first responses
of the European Union, alerted by KyivÕs open declarations of its
pro-American option, also confirm this. The Gteborg summit in
June recognised UkraineÕsEuropean aspirations and invited it to
take part in the European Conference, thus awarding it the same
status as Turkey enjoys. This was followed by further gestures,
the importance of which was nevertheless weakened by the ab-
sence of any consequential representation from the EU at the ce-
lebration of the tenth anniversary of UkraineÕs independence.
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This proved that the unofficial isolation of president Kuchma,
which followed the winterÕs political crisis, continues. 
Some time before, the June visit of John Paul II to Ukraine brought
about aheightening of the Ukrainian politiciansÕ pro-Western and
pro-European rhetoric, and undoubtedly, it also strengthened the
supporters of the truly pro-Western option in Ukraine. On the
other hand, the fact that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the
Moscow Patriarchy strongly objected to this visit and that this ob-
jection was supported by the Russian ambassador could easily
disturb Ukrainian Ð Russian relations. This was not the case, tho-
ugh, which confirms that the pragmatic tendency in KyivÕs policy
is gaining force. 
On the 29th of July in Sevastopol the presidents of Russia and
Ukraine jointly celebrated the Day of the Russian FederationÕ s
Navy and the Day of UkraineÕs Navy58, taking the joint salute of
the two fleets. In this way Vladimir Putin symbolically closed the
Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol dispute, which for years before
had been a cause of conflicts and tensions in the bilateral rela-
tions of the two countries. Less than a month later Putin partici-
pated in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of UkraineÕs in-
dependence, our common jubilee, as he put it. It was a s y m b o l i c
declaration recognising Ukraine as an equal partner, a gesture 
that opened a new perspective for the mutual relations of Ukraine
and Russia. 
This does not mean, however, that either of the parties is willing
to make any extensive concessions. We continue to get fragmen-
tary information on the negotiations regarding the transit of Rus-
sian electricity through the territory of Ukraine. This shows that
both sides are determined to defend their interests and that it will
be very difficult to reach a compromise. 
It seems that Ukraine will continue to pursue its present policy of
developing closer relations with the Russian Federation and the
United States, and, where possible, also with the European
Union, though relations with the EU will be treated as a lower
priority. Whether and to what extent KyivÕs policy in these areas
will prove effective will depend first and foremost on the political
objectives and tactics of Moscow and Washington.
UkraineÕs attainment of the main goal of this calculation, i.e.
partner, even if asymmetric, relations with the Russian Federa-
tion, is a different issue. Such a development is possible, but
a certain degree of scepticism also seems justified.
If Russia continues to pursue its pragmatic interests in the post-
Soviet area, the Òasymmetric partnershipÓ model will seem feasi-
ble, and even likely, since the basic interests of the two states are
not contradictory or irreconcilable. What makes it likely is espe-
cially the fact that this model of Ukrainian Ð Russian relations
would be beneficial not only for Ukraine and its political classes
(which is obvious), but also for Russia and the political classes
there, as it would enhance the Russian stateÕsimage in the inter-
national scene. 
If, however, Russia should relapse into superpower and imperia -
listic policies (and not just such rhetoric), which does not seem
likely, but is nevertheless possible, the partnership model would
have to break down. But even then it is barely probable that Rus-
sia should attempt a political reintegration with Ukraine. Ukraine
now has numerous and powerful political groups whose vital in-
terests are dependent on the stateÕs sovereignty, and Moscow
cannot fail to take them into account. Russian political analysts
also believe that an attempt to openly subjugate Ukraine would
lead to awar in its western parts. This opinion may be exaggera-
ted but it acts in favour of Ukraine. Finally, unless Russia wants
to break off relations with the international community (which is
extremely unlikely), it cannot afford either to liquidate a sovere-
ign state or to overtly disregard an important strategic interest of
the United States. 
Thus, a lot will depend on the policy of the US, from the point of
view of which Ukraine is first and foremost a Black Sea country,
and its independence and stability are an important factor for the
security of Turkey, one of the key states in the region and an im-
portant ally of the US. Therefore, one can presume that the Ame-
ricans will support the steadying of UkraineÕs independence and
counteract any developments that might put it in jeopardy. It is
highly unlikely, though, that the Americans should openly challen-
ge Russia by offering Ukraine NATO membership, because such
a development would be sure to vex Ukrainian Ð Russian rela-
tions and might even imperil UkraineÕs security.
Whatever developments in political relations occur, Ukraine will
remain economically dependent on Russia. This dependence may
become weaker, but it will not disappear altogether. As the Ame-
rican analyst Sherman W. Garnett soberly notes, while Russian
economic predominance or even dominance is possible in some
sectors, but UkraineÕs economy is too large and Ru s s i aÕ s pro-
blems are too great to see it as astrategic threat to an indepen-
dent Ukraine59. However, the degree of economic dependence
(especially in the area of power supplies), and the scope and
transparency of the ties existing between the Ukrainian and Rus-
sian business and political circles, will certainly determine the
extent to which Kyiv will be able to take really independent deci-
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sions. Today, even though the degree of dependence is high and
the ties strong, this affects KyivÕs decision ability to only a small
extent. In the future, this influence may be stronger or weaker, but
it is highly unlikely that it should become powerful enough to al-
together deprive Ukraine of its sovereignty in this respect. 
VI. Post Script: Facing the war
against terrorism
The terrorist attack on the United States and this countryÕs mili-
tary response opened a new chapter in the American Ð Russian
relations. It is difficult to say at the moment how far the tighte-
ning of co-operation between Moscow and Washington will go,
and how it will affect the situation of Ukraine. Kyiv firmly supports
the United StatesÕ actions, having granted the US Air Force bro-
ader access to its airspace than Moscow has60. Also, Kyiv will
probably be willing to increase its involvement in the peace for-
ces in the Balkans, if such a need arises. 
In the context of these events the ÒZlenko doctrineÓ discussed
above acquires a new meaning: the Russian Ð American rappro-
chement will make it easier for Ukraine to pursue its present po-
licy of economic and, partly, political alignment with its northern
neighbour, counterpoised by closer co-operation with the United
States. This political line of Kyiv, and the relative policy of Mo-
scow, may meet with wider support from Washington. 
Tadeusz Andrzej OlszaÄski
[Warsaw, September 2001]
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